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Criminal Law-Right to Counsel-Davis v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994)
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."' The United States Supreme Court has
determined that implicit in this right against self-incrimination is a
litited right to have the assistance of counsel prior to and during
police custodial interrogation.2  However, unlike the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel' which "automatically attaches at the
initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings,"4 the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel is not self-executing and must be affirmatively
claimed.5 Furthermore, since the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2. See infra note 26 (discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).
Custodial interrogation, as defined by the Miranda Court, is "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Janet E.
Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Inter-
rogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 294 (1993) ("The Miranda Court determined that implicit
within the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is the right to have the
assistance of counsel while being questioned in police custody."); Jeff L'Hote, Note,
Duckworth v. Eagan: A Semantical Debate or the Continuing Debasement of Miranda?,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1990) ("While [the self-incrimination] clause does not
directly guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel, the United States Supreme
Court interprets the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to afford an accused
a limited right to counsel prior to and during police interrogation.").
3. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
4. Daniel C. Nester, Distinguishing Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to Counsel
During Police Questioning, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 101,108 (1991); see also Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 633 n.6 (1986) (suggesting that the right to counsel does not depend upon
such a request); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversarial judicial
proceedings have been initiated against the defendant); Rick Madden & Cheryl M. Miller,
Project, Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.. 1007, 1007-08 (1994) ("The [Sixth
Amendment] right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings
... and no request for counsel need be made by the accused.").
5. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 295. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel also
differs from the Sixth Amendment in purpose and scope. See Craig R. Johnson, Note,
McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
1643, 1658 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment is at the same time broader and narrower
than the Fifth Amendment right to counsel); Kenneth P. Jones, Note, McNeil v. Wisconsin:
Invocation of Right to Counsel Under Sixth Amendment by Accused at Judicial Proceeding
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is implied rather than expressly stated in the Constition, the Supreme
Court has more latitude to interpret it.6
The Court's most recent cases have held that all police ques-
tioning must cease when a criminal suspect asserts clearly his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel.7 Prior to Davis v. United States,8 the
consequences of an ambiguous reference to counsel were uncertain.,
In an opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor,0 the Court held in
Does Not Constitute Invocation of Miranda Right to Counsel for Unrelated Charge, 26 GA.
L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1992) ("Although the Miranda Fifth Amendment and Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel sometimes overlap, they have essentially different
purposes."). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to provide assistance
to the unaided layman during the "critical stages" of a criminal proceeding when he is
"faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society and immersed in the intricacies
of substantive and procedural criminal law." United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189
(1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). The Fifth Amendment right
to counsel, however, is designed "to protect the suspect's expressed desire to communicate
with the police only through counsel." Johnson, supra, at 1658. In essence, the Fifth
Amendment right is not "actually a right to a lawyer in particular, but rather the right to
have good advice during police interrogation so the privilege against self-incrimination will
not be unwittingly surrendered." Id. Nevertheless, it is usually an attorney, skilled in the
rules of evidence and criminal law, who can provide the most competent advice in such
a situation. Id.; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,719 (1979) (emphasizing that the
right to have counsel present during interrogation is indispensable because of the "special
ability of the lawyer to help the client preserve his Fifth Amendment rights once the client
becomes enmeshed in the adversary process").
While the Fifth Amendment right to counsel arises in the context of any custodial
interrogation once it is asserted, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, the Sixth Amendment is
narrower in that it attaches only after the initiation of judicial proceedings, United States
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984). However, the Sixth Amendment is broader in that
it applies to situations beyond custodial interrogation, Johnson, supra, at 1658; see Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269-70
(1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,204-05 (1964), and it attaches automatically,
Nester, supra note 4, at 108.
6. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 688 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(implying that because the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not constitutionally
mandated but was created by the Court, the Court has the power to expand or restrict it);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974) (recognizing that the procedural
safeguards in Miranda were not rights protected by the Constitution but were created by
the Court to secure the privilege against self-incrimination).
7. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S 477,484-85 (1981). Questioning can resume once
counsel is made available to the suspect or if the suspect himself initiates further
conversation. Id.; see also infra note 31.
8. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
9. See Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 298; Ada Clapp, The Second Circuit Adopts a
Clarification Approach to Ambiguous Requests for Counsel. United States v. Gotay, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 511, 515-16 (1990).
10. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2350. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. Justice Scalia filed a separate
concurring opinion, id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring); see infra note 34, and Justice Souter
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
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Davis that the privilege against further questioning does not extend
to a suspect whose request for counsel is ambiguous."
The defendant, Navy sailor Robert L. Davis, was questioned by
the Naval Investigative Service ("NIS") about the murder of a fellow
sailor, Keith Shackleford.'2 At the beginning of the interview, the
NIS officers informed Davis that he had a right to remain silent, and
that he was entitled to speak with an attorney and to have an attorney
present during questioning. 3 Davis nonetheless waived his rights,
both orally and in writing. 4
Approximately ninety minutes into the interview, however, Davis
declared, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."'" The interviewing
agents momentarily stopped questioning Davis and made it clear to
him that they did not want to violate his rights, and that they would
stop the interrogation if he wanted a lawyer. 6  Davis then
responded, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer," and "No, I don't want
a lawyer."" The agents, after again reminding Davis of his rights,
continued the questioning. 8 About an hour later, Davis said, "I
think I want a lawyer before I say anything else,"'" whereupon the
agents stopped the interview.' °
At his court-martial, Davis unsuccessfully moved to suppress
statements made during the interview.2' Consequently, he was
Ginsburg joined, Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see
infra notes 35-38, 67-69, 82-83, 93-95, and accompanying text.
11. Id at 2355-57.
12. Id. at 2352-53.
13. Id. at 2353.
14. Idi The Court established the standard for waiver of one's constitutional right in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The Johnson Court pointed out that there
is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and that, therefore, "[a] waiver
is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Id To determine whether "there has been an intelligent waiver of a right to counsel...
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused," must be considered. Id.
Although Johnson is a Sixth Amendment case, its test for the waiver of a
constitutional right has been applied in Fifth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,680-81 (1988); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,1044-45 (1983);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,484 (1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,372-
76 (1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966).






21. Id The military judge held that" tthe mention of a lawyer by [Davis] during the
course of the interrogation [was] not in the form for a request for counsel and ... the
1995] 2015
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convicted of murder, sentenced to life in prison, and dishonorably
discharged.' The convening authority, the Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Military Review, and the United States Court of Military
Appeals all affirmed the sentence.24 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.'
Affirming the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court held
that a "suspect must unambiguously request counsel" in order to
invoke his Miranda right to counsel.26 The majority required that
the request for counsel be articulated clearly enough that "a
reasonable officer in the circumstances would understand the
agents properly determined that [Davis] was not indicating a desire for or invoking his
right to counsel.' " Id. (quotation omitted).
22. Id. The United States Court of Military Appeals held that Davis's comment was
ambiguous and that the interrogating agents properly attempted to clarify Davis's
reference to counsel before continuing with any further questions. United States v. Davis,
36 M.J. 337, 341-42 (1993), aff'd, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
23. The convening authority is the commissioned officer in command of a military unit
that has the authority to convene a court-martial. See R.C.M. 504(a)-(b) (Manual for
Courts Martial).
24. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
25. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993).
26. Id. at 2355; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). The Miranda
Court "injected the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination into confession
case analysis." Mathew W.D. Bowman, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
Interrogation: Equivocal References to an Attorney--Determining What Statements or
Conduct Should Constitute an Accused's Invocation of the Right to Counsel, 39 VAND. L.
REv. 1159, 1165 (1986). The Court reasoned that the process of custodial interrogation
contains inherent pressures that work to compel people to speak when they perhaps prefer
to remain silent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court then held that "[iln order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination," certain safeguards must be in place, including informing the accused
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney. Id If the suspect "indicates in any
manner" that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is
present. Id. at 444-45.
The Miranda Court limited custodial interrogations:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning .... The mere fact that
he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.
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statement to be a request for an attorney."'27 If a statement is so
unclear that it cannot reasonably be construed as a request for
counsel, then no request for counsel is deemed to have been made s
and questioning may continue.29
The Court reasoned that requiring officers to stop questioning a
suspect after a statement gave them a reasonable doubt as to whether
the suspect wanted a lawyer would transform the Miranda safeguards
"into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative
activity because [they] would needlessly prevent the police from
questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect did
not wish to have a lawyer present."' Furthermore, the majority
believed that the ease of applying the bright-line test formulated in
Edwards v. Arizona-"questioning must cease if a suspect asks for a
lawyer"3 --would be significantly eroded if officers had to decipher
ambiguous statements.3 2 Though the Court conceded that this rule
might harm suspects who are too intimidated to articulate clearly their
request for counsel, 3 it nevertheless concluded that a complete
understanding of the Miranda warnings would provide sufficient
protection against whatever coercion is inherent in the questioning process 4
27. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court held that a statement is either a request for
counsel or it is not; there is no middle ground. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
31. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). In Edwards, the Court held that questioning must
cease when a suspect has asserted his right to have counsel present during custodial inter-
rogation. Id. The Court established that "an accused[, ... having expressed his desire
to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless... [he] initiates further
communication ... with the police." Id. The Court intended the rule established in
Edwards to serve as a bright-line test indicating to law enforcement officers when they had
to stop questioning a suspect. Id. As the Court noted in later cases, "the merit of the
Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application,"
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990), and the "rule ... provid[es] clear and
unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession," Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675, 682 (1988).
32. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356 (citation omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. Justice Scalia concurred with the Court's decision, id. at 2357 (Scalia, J.,
concurring), but wrote separately to express his concern over the Court's refusal to
consider a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 which governs admissibility of confessions in
federal prosecutions. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring). Section 3501
provides, in relevant part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution ... a confession ... shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in
evidence, the trial judge shall ... determine any issue as to voluntariness.
1995] 2017
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Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Ginsburg, concurred only in the Court's judgment.35 Justice Souter
argued that, "when law enforcement officers treasonably do not know
whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer[,]' ... they should stop
their interrogation and ask him to make his choice clear."36 The
interrogators should not be able to ignore a suspect's statement that,
although ambiguous, may still indicate a desire to consult with a
lawyer 7 Justice Souter concurred in the judgment because it
appeared from the record that the interviewing agents did in fact stop
and ask for clarification.38
Despite the extensive number of cases that addressed the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel,39 the Supreme Court did not determine
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including... (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was
not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such
defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when
giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned
factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the
issue of voluntariness of the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988). Even though the Department of Justice declined to raise the
issue, Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring), Justice Scalia argued that the Court
shirked its judicial responsibility by ignoring the statute, especially when confronted with
Miranda issues that might be irrelevant under the statute. Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). He pointed out that the executive, through the exercise of its prosecutorial
discretion, can effectively nullify some provisions of law by merely failing to prosecute.
Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring). Similarly, the executive "has the power.., to avoid
application of § 3501 by simply declining to introduce into evidence confessions admissible
under its terms." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
36. 1i (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 2355).
37. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
38. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
39. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that when a
defendant requests counsel, officials must not only stop the interrogation, but may not
reinitiate questioning without the presence of counsel, whether or not the defendant has
consulted with an attorney); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988) (holding that
an assertion of the right to counsel, unlike an assertion of the right to remain silent, does
bar later interrogation about another crime); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984)
(holding that "where nothing about a request for counsel ... renders it ambiguous.., an
accused's post-request responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast
retrospective doubt upon the clarity of his initial request for counsel"); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (permitting police officers to withhold the Miranda
warnings whenever custodial interrogation concerns public safety); Oregon v. Bradshaw,
462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (holding that a suspect's initiation of further conversation does
not waive his right to counsel but does lift the Edwards prohibition and allows police to
[Vol. 732018
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before Davis the legal significance of an ambiguous assertion of that
right.' After Miranda, the Court reinterpreted and narrowed the
scope of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel in several situations,
indicating that it would favor a narrow interpretation of a suspect's re-
quest.4 Other post-Miranda decisions maintained the generous
language of Miranda, however, and seemed to support a more liberal
construction.42 This inconsistent judicial treatment created "conflict-
ing messages for developing a standard to determine when an
continue questioning); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that
questioning of a suspect must cease when he has clearly asserted his right to have counsel
present during custodial interrogation); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727-28 (1979)
(holding that a juvenile's request for a probation officer was not a request for counsel);
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,374 (1979) (holding that an explicit waiver was not
necessary to find that a defendant has waived his right to counsel and that the question
of waiver should be determined by the "particular facts and circumstances surrounding the
case" (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938))); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 105-06 (1975) (holding that as long as a suspect who has expressed a desire to remain
silent maintains his right to terminate questioning, the police can reinterrogate a suspect
if a significant period of time has passed and the second interrogation focuses on a
different crime); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-45 (1974) (holding that even
though the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the police
did not inform him that counsel could have been appointed for him, his right against
compulsory self-incrimination was not infringed until any of his statements taken without
the presence of counsel were used against him at trial); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
224 (1971) (holding that prosecutors can use a defendant's confession obtained in violation
of Miranda to impeach a his credibility if he chooses to testify).
40. See Charles R. Shreffier, Jr., Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous Request for
Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 460, 460 (1987).
41. Clapp, supra note 9, at 515; see also Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657 (permitting the police
to withhold Miranda warnings whenever custodial interrogation concerns public safety);
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (implying that a suspect's request must be clearly asserted);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980) (narrowing the definition of "inter-
rogation"); Fare, 442 U.S. at 722-23 (defining "counsel" specifically to mean an attorney);
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04 (permitting the resumption of questioning after a suspect has
exercised his right to remain silent); Harris, 401 U.S. at 224 (allowing prosecutors to use
statements obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant's credibility if he
chooses to testify).
42. Clapp, supra note 9, at 516; see also Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683-85 (barring further
interrogation even when the questions were about a different crime); Edwards, 451 U.S.
at 484-85 (adopting a per se rule against any further interrogation once the suspect has
invoked his right to counsel); Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (indicating that there should not be
a requirement that the right to counsel be explicitly invoked).
Notably, however, there have been recent efforts to reinvigorate Miranda. Nelson G.
Wolff, Minnick v. Mississippi: The Supreme Court Reinforces a Suspect's Right to Have
Counsel Present During Custodial Interrogation, 56 Mo. L. REv. 1157, 1181 (1991); see,
e.g., Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153 (holding that when a defendant requests counsel, officials
must not only stop the interrogation, but may not reinitiate questioning without the
presence of counsel, whether or not the defendant has consulted with an attorney).
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accused's ambiguous request for an attorney" is sufficient to trigger
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.43
Before Davis, the Supreme Court expressly refused to decide
what police officers should do when an initial request for an attorney
is ambiguous." Lower courts, however, developed three different
positions on this question.45 Under "the so-called threshold-of-clarity
standard,.., an attempted invocation of the right to counsel [had to]
satisfy a certain threshold of clarity before it w[ould] be considered
effective."' 6 Another standard adopted by some lower courts was
the "per se invocation standard."'47 Under this standard, any post-
warning reference to an attorney by the suspect was considered a per
se invocation of the right to counsel, and all police-initiated ques-
tioning had to stop.4 The third approach was the clarification stan-
dard.49 Some courts permitted the police to continue the inter-
rogation to clarify the suspect's intent following an ambiguous
invocation of the right to counsel5
43. Clapp, supra note 9, at 515; see also Shreffler, supra note 40, at 460 (arguing that
by narrowing Miranda, the Court created new questions, including the effect of an
ambiguous request for counsel).
44. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,530 n.3 (1987); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
91, 99-100 (1984).
45. See Shreffler, supra note 40, at 460.
46. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 301; see also, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537,
540 (Ill. 1980) (holding that an accused's reference to an attorney must meet a threshold
standard of clarity before a court will consider the statement to be an invocation of the
right to counsel); People v. Harper, 418 N.E.2d 894, 896-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding
that a defendant's request for his wallet containing his lawyer's business card was
insufficient to invoke his right to counsel); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 430 (Iowa
1982) (finding that a defendant had not effectively invoked his right to counsel when he
asked his interrogators if he should have an attorney present); State v. Phillips, 563 S.W.2d
47,53-54 (Mo. 1978) (finding the defendant had not invoked his right to counsel by stating
that he did not know whether he should consult with an attorney).
47. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 301.
48. Id.; see; eg., People v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (Cal. 1975)
(emphasizing that no particular form of words or conduct is necessary for a defendant to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796, 800-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (finding a sufficient
invocation of the right to counsel when the defendant stated that he thought he should talk
to an attorney before answering any questions or signing anything).
49. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 302.
50. l&; see also, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding that a previous indication of interest in talking with an attorney required the
interrogating agent to stop all questioning except that necessary to clarify the equivocal
request); Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that the
purpose of clarifying questions is to discern the intent of the suspect); Nash v. Estelle, 597
F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir.) (holding that when an accused makes an equivocal reference to
an attorney, the police may inquire further to clarify the accused's wishes), cert. denied, 444
2020 [Vol. 73
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The standard promulgated in Davis is similar to the threshold-of-
clarity standard,' which was consistent with some of the Court's
prior decisions that narrowed Miranda.52 However, other Supreme
Court decisions seem inconsistent with the standard adopted in Davis.
The most obvious example is Miranda itself in which the Court held
that all questioning must stop once a suspect indicated "in any
manner" that he wished to consult with an attorney.53 The Miranda
Court's language implied that it would liberally construe a suspect's
request for counsel 4 Furthermore, the Miranda Court's emphasis
on the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations"5
"suggest[ed] that the suspect should be given the benefit of the doubt
in the interpretation of ambiguous requests for counsel. 5 6 The
standard adopted in Davis, appears to violate both the language and
spirit of Miranda.57
U.S. 981 (1971).
51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. For example, Edwards v. Arizona, by prohibiting any further questioning of a
suspect that had clearly asserted his right to counsel, 451 U.S. 477,485 (1981), implied that
an explicit invocation is required. Clapp, supra note 9, at 519; see also-Ainsworth, supra
note 2, at 299 (arguing that Edwards can be read to require an unambiguous or decisive
assertion by the suspect). The decision in "Edwards shifted the burden of clarity ...
toward the defendant." Shreffler, supra note 40, at 465. By requiring the right to counsel
to be clearly asserted, "the tin any manner' language of Miranda was all but overruled."
l. at 465 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1965)).
Similarly, in Michigan v. Mosley, by not giving the same practical effect to a request
to remain silent as to a request for counsel, 423 U.S. 96, 100-04, the Court implied that if
a suspect wants an attorney, he has to ask for one. Shreffler, supra note 40, at 463 n.18.
Furthermore, the effect of Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), was to limit Miranda's
prohibition on further interrogation to explicit requests for an attorney. Shreffler, supra
note 40, at 463; see also Fare, 442 U.S. at 722 (distinguishing a request for counsel from
a request for a probation officer).
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
54. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 299.
55. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58, 467.
56. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 298. Miranda has in fact been relied upon by many
lower courts to require a "per se standard," under which any request for an attorney
would be sufficient to invoke the suspect's Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Shreffler,
supra note 40, at 468; see also, eg., Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978)
(relying on the "in any manner" language in Miranda to find that the suspect had invoked
his right to counsel when he stated, "Maybe I should have an attorney.").
57. See Clapp, supra note 9, at 545 ("[T]he spirit of Miranda favors a broad
interpretation of invocation."). North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), also
provides support for a broader approach to the interpretation of suspects' requests for
counsel. See Clapp, supra note 9, at 522. In Butler, the Court held that since a waiver of
one's right to counsel can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the suspect,
the invocation of that right should be similarly inferred. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. Butler
indicated that since the Court did not require an explicit waiver of the right to counsel,
neither would it require an explicit invocation of that right. See Clapp, supra note 9, at
1995] 2021
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Whether supported by precedent or not, the Davis Court
established a threshold-of-clarity standard for determining whether an
ambiguous reference to an attorney is sufficient to invoke a suspect's
Fifth Amendment right to counsel.58 The Court adopted this
threshold standard to avoid unduly hampering police investigations 9
by requiring officers to stop questioning a suspect who may not even
wish to have counsel present.' Because the police are not required
to stop questioning a suspect who has consented to answer questions
in the absence of counsel, a broader standard might needlessly
prevent them from gathering critical information.
6'
The Court was also interested in preserving the clear rule
established in Edwards v. Arizona.62 The Court explained that
"[t]he Edwards rule-[that] questioning must cease if the suspect asks
for a lawyer-provides a bright line that can be applied by officers in
the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly
523.
Similarly, the decisions in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Roberson v.
Arizona, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), also seem to favor liberal interpretations of requests for
counsel. Clapp, supra note 9, at 520-21. Edwards adopted a per se rule that prohibited
any further questioning of the accused once he had invoked his right to counsel, unless the
accused himself initiated further conversation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Roberson
barred interrogation after the accused had invoked his right to counsel, even if the
questions were about a different and unrelated crime. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682-85. Both
of these holdings functioned to afford more protection to the accused's right to counsel
during custodial interrogation. Clapp, supra note 9, at 521.
Justice Souter argued in Davis that the Court's decision was inconsistent with prior
holdings. S. Ct. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). He pointed out that, in
the past, the Court had been dissuaded from "placing any burden of clarity upon
individuals in custody" and had required that "requests for counsel be tgive[n] a broad,
rather than a narrow interpretation.' " IdL (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Connecticut v. Barret, 479 U.S. 523, 549 (1987)).
58. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
59. See id. at 2355-56; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. As one
commentator has argued, the current Supreme Court is hostile to perceived interferences
with law enforcement. Jones, supra note 5, at 1068.
60. Id at 2356. The Court also rejected a standard that would require the police to
ask clarifying questions of a suspect who has made an ambiguous request for counsel. Id.
at 2356. However, it does not appear that it rejected this standard because of any
interference with police activity. In fact, the Court suggested it would "be good police
practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not [the suspect] actually wants
an attorney." Id
It should be noted that the Davis standard applies only after the suspect has
unambiguously waived his right to counsel. See Connecticut v. Barret, 479 U.S. 523, 529
(1987); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,373-76 (1979). Davis had waived his right
to counsel both orally and in writing before the NIS agents began the interview. Davis,
114 S. Ct. at 2353.
61. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
62. 451 U.S. 477 (1981); see supra note 31.
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hampering the gathering of information." 63 The Court noted that if
it "were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes a
statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease
of application would be lost."' It adopted, therefore, a standard
that allows the police to continue questioning until it appears
reasonably clear that the suspect has requested counsel.65
Contrary to the Court's conclusion, the threshold-of-clarity
standard may actually hamper police activity by failing to provide the
police with clear guidelines.' As Justice Souter pointed out, the
majority did not define when an assertion is clear and when it is
not.' Thus, he argued, "every approach, including the majority's,
will involve some difficult judgment calls,"'  and police judgment
calls, according to the majority, would erode the bright-line test of
Edwards.69 Therefore, if the Court's threshold-of-clarity standard
still requires the police to make judgment calls concerning whether a
suspect actually wants an attorney or not, then the "clarity and ease
of application" of the Edwards rule will still be lost.
Not only may the Davis standard hamper police activity, it also
may encourage improprieties by interrogating officers.70 Faced with
the knowledge that the interrogation must cease once the suspect
63. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990)
("The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty
of its application.").
64. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. The Court further stated that the bright-line rule would
be eroded by a per se standard because "police officers would be forced to make difficult
judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he hasn't said
so, with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong." Id.
65. Id. at 2355-56.
66. Bowman, supra note 26, at 1190.
67. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 n.7 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Souter explained that "in the abstract, nothing may seem more clear than a 'clear
statement' rule, but in police stations and trial courts. the question, 'how clear is clear?,'
is not so readily answered." Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). For example, in
Smith v. Illinois, when the suspect responded, "Uh, yeah, I'd like to do that," upon being
told that he had a right to have a lawyer present during questioning, some members of the
Court thought the statement was an unambiguous request for counsel, 469 U.S. 91, 97
(1984), while the dissent questioned the clarity of the statement, id at 101 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 n.7 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter
argued for a standard that would require the police to clarify a suspect's ambiguous
request for counsel. Id at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Such an
approach would assure that any judgment calls would "be made by the party most
competent to resolve the ambiguity[,] ... the individual suspect." Id. at 2363 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
69. See id. at 2356.
70. See Bowman, supra note 26, at 1190.
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clearly invokes his right to counsel, officers may wrongly interpret
assertions as too ambiguous to invoke the right to counsel.71 In
other words, the police may be tempted to raise the requisite
threshold of clarity to avoid having to end the interrogation.72
Because courts often will give deference to the police officer's
interpretation of statements made during an interrogation,73 the
police would have the opportunity to manipulate the threshold to
their advantage.
Aside from the effects the Davis standard may have on the
activities of law enforcement officers, it may also have dire conse-
quences for those suspects who "will not clearly articulate their right
to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present."7 4
As one commentator has argued,
[r]equiring an accused to meet a threshold standard of clarity
may deny protection to the inarticulate, who fail to state
clearly a desire for counsel; to the nervous, who cannot
maintain sufficient composure to determine what is in their
best interests or to ensure that police are truly receptive to
their desires; and to the inhibited, who out of fear or
ignorance fail to press their desire for counsel strongly
enough.
75
Thus, those suspects who may be too timid or unsophisticated to
clearly assert their right to counsel may be denied their Fifth
Amendment right under the Court's threshold-of-clarity standard.76
71. 1d
72. Id.
73. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 n.7 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. Id. at 2356.
75. Bowman, supra note 26, at 1188.
76. As Justice Souter pointed out, a substantial number of suspects will either lack a
competent command of the English language, be "woefully ignorant," or become so
overwhelmed by the interrogation process that they will not be able to speak assertively.
Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966)).
The threshold-of-clarity standard has operated in some lower courts to deny the right
to counsel to those who "rely on normal conversational implicature" to get their meaning
across when talking with police. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 305-06. For example, courts
have held that suspects who said "I think," "I'd like to," "I wonder," "maybe," or "I feel
like" in conjunction with attempting to request counsel, failed to assert their right
sufficiently to invoke their Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 303-04. Furthermore, courts
have also held that "suspects who seek confirmation that they are entitled to counsel, who
ask their interrogators how they can get a lawyer, or who ask the police whether they need
a lawyer," have not invoked their right to counsel. Id. at 304. These suspects are denied
their right to counsel because the threshold-of-clarity standard "tends to operate without
regard for inferences inherent in normal conversation, by emphasizing the literal meaning
2024 [Vol. 73
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The majority in Davis recognized that its opinion may disad-
vantage some suspects, but it dismissed this concern by reasoning that
full comprehension of the Miranda warnings would provide sufficient
protection for the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.7  However,
such a dismissal of the rights of timid or unsophisticated members of
the population appears inconsistent with the Court's prior concern
with protecting the right to counsel.7" Given the high standards that
the Court has erected to determine when a suspect has asserted the
right to counsel,7 9 it is odd that the Court would make it easier to
find that the suspect did not assert his right to counsel in the first
place. Furthermore, the Court has often emphasized the importance
of the right to have counsel present during police interrogations as a
safeguard of the suspect's right against self-incrimination.0 In the
Sixth Amendment context, the Court itself has recognized that any
ambiguity in a suspect's request for counsel should be resolved in his
favor.81
of a suspect's words in preference to their indirectly implicated meaning." Id. at 302.
77. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)).
78. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,481-85 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436,469-79 (1966); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,70-73 (1932) (recognizing that
the right to the assistance of counsel is fundamental).
79. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (placing the burden of
establishing a valid waiver on the State); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that a waiver
has to be made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S
458, 464 (1938) (pointing out that there is a presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights). As the majority in Davis stated, "[t]he right to counsel recognized
in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations ... that it
trequirfes] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.'" Davis,
114 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 483).
80. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 ("[T]he right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege."). The
Miranda Court noted that the presence of counsel during interrogations may serve other
functions as well. Id. at 470. The Court stated:
If the accuspd decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can
mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood
that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless
exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also
help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police
and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial.
Id.; see, eg., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n.5 (1984) ("[W]e required
counsel in Miranda. .. in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,226 (1967) (stating that the right to
the presence of counsel was "necessary to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination
from being jeopardized by... interrogation").
81. In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), the Court decided that, in the Sixth
Amendment context, any ambiguity in the request for counsel should be resolved in favor
of the accused. Id. at 633. The Court explained that a broad interpretation of a
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As an alternative to the Davis majority's threshold standard,
Justice Souter argued for a clarification standard.' Rather than
allowing the police to continue interrogating a suspect after an
equivocal request for counsel, Justice Souter would require police
officers, following an ambiguous statement, to ascertain whether the
suspect actually wants an attorney.' This standard not only would
ensure that a suspect may choose whether to deal with the police
through counsel, but also would provide a workable solution to the
misunderstandings that often arise between suspect and inter-
rogator.8'
defendant's request is necessary because "we presume that the defendant requests the
lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution." ld The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings, Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S 45, 57 (1932), and the Court has long recognized the importance of
counsel in that process, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Powell, 287 U.S.
at 68-69. As the Powell Court noted:
[E]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel, however, since it does not attach automatic-
ally, does not enjoy the presumption articulated in Jackson. See Ainsworth, supra note 2,
at 294-95. However, the Miranda Court recognized that custodial interrogations were the
actual beginning of the adversarial proceedings. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 194 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477). If that is so, then the
concerns expressed in the Sixth Amendment cases about the uneducated layperson facing
the adversarial system alone would seem to apply in the Fifth Amendment context as well.
Thus, perhaps a suspect's Fifth Amendment request for counsel should be interpreted as
broadly as a defendant's request for counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
82. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. Id (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter, however, did not
believe that an ambiguous statement should bring an end to all questioning. He argued
that "[w]hile it is plainly wrong... to continue interrogation when the suspect wants it to
stop ... the strong bias in favor of individual choice may also be disserved by stopping
questioning when a suspect wants it to continue." Id, at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
84. Id. at 2360; see also Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 311 (arguing that by permitting
the police to continue the exchange with the suspect, while at the same time giving some
legal effect to ambiguous requests for counsel, the clarification approach "appears to strike
a reasonable balance between the desire of law enforcement to conduct suspect inter-
rogations and the need to guarantee that individuals can exercise their constitutional right
to counsel"); Bowman, supra note 26, at 1190 (suggesting that the clarification approach
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The clarification standard, however, is not without problems of
its own." Like the threshold standard, a rule permitting clarifying
questions also would conflict with Miranda's premise that all
questioning must cease once a suspect indicates in any manner that he
does not want to proceed without an attorney present."6 Further-
more, the clarification approach arguably is "subjective and places too
much discretion in the hands of the interrogating officers to interpret
whether a suspect's request for counsel was equivocal and, thus, to
determine whether subsequent questioning is permitted."'  Even if
interrogating officers decide that they must clarify a suspect's request,
the clarifying questions could be used to dissuade the suspect from
asserting his right to counsel.8 Thus, "[i]n practice, the clarification
approach is scarcely more generous in its protection of individual
rights than is the threshold-of-clarity standard."89
Justice Souter disagreed not only with the majority's standard,
but also with the reasoning the majority used to reach its conclusion.
The Court relied on McNeil v. Wisconsin' and Edwards v.
Arizona9 in ruling that "if a suspect makes a reference to an
attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer
in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the
"provides clear guidelines for interrogating officers and does not unduly burden legitimate
criminal investigations").
85. See Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 311; Bowman, supra note 26, at 1189; Clapp, supra
note 9, at 534.
86. Clapp, supra note 9, at 545; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153
(1990) (holding that once counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and the police
cannot reinitiate interrogation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) ("If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning.., that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease.").
87. Bowman, supra note 26, at 1189.
88. Clapp, supra note 9, at 534. As Professor Clapp argued, the continued questioning
associated with the clarification approach has a potentially coercive effect. Id at 541.
89. Ainsworth, supra note 2, at 315. However, if a suspect has unambiguously
requested counsel, his "postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to
cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91,
91 (1984).
90. 501 U.S. 171 (1991). McNeil was a Sixth Amendment case in which the Supreme
Court distinguished between the consequences of invoking one's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and one's Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 175-78. The Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense-specific," meaning that when an
accused asserts his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the right attaches only with respect
to the particular crime about which he currently is being questioned. Id. at 175. The
police are free to elicit incriminating statements about other crimes. Id at 176. Once a
suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel regarding one offense, he cannot
thereafter be interrogated about any offense unless counsel is present. Id at 177.
91. 451 U.S. 477 (1981); see also supra note 31.
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suspect might be invoking the right to counsel," questioning does not
have to stop. 2 However, as Justice Souter observed, the McNeil
Court "was not addressing the degree of clarity required to activate
the counsel right."'93 He also asserted that the quoted passage from
Edwards was not dispositive because that case did not decide the
"legal consequences of a less than tclear' statement."94  Conse-
quently, according to Justice Souter, the majority's holding was not
mandated by any of the Court's prior decisions, and for the majority
to assert otherwise was an erroneous application of precedent.'
While it is not unusual for the Court to be concerned with
maintaining effective law enforcement, 96 Davis may have taken this
concern too far. To avoid interfering with criminal investigations and
to preserve the bright-line rule of Edwards (which, arguably, was
eroded by the Court's decision7), the Court was willing to sacrifice
the constitutional rights of those suspects who fail to assert clearly
their right to counsel.9" By denying the right to counsel to those
individuals, the Court not only violated Miranda's "in any manner"
language, but also contradicted "the prophylactic intent of Miran-
da."99 The Court established the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
in Miranda because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial
92. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
93. Id, at 2360 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
94. Id, (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
95. Id (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter also pointed out that,
had the issue been resolved by the prior decisions, there would have been no need for the
Court to hear Davis. Id (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
96. The Court has often articulated a concern over interfering with law enforcement.
The decision in Miranda was specifically "not intended to hamper the traditional function
of police officers in investigating crime." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court recognized the need to address the concerns that its
decision would reduce the number of confessions that the police would be able to obtain.
378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964). In addition, the holding in Michigan v. Harvey showed a
deference to law enforcement in allowing the prosecution to use statements which
normally would be inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant. 494 U.S.
344, 345-46 (1990). As the Court noted in Minnick v. Mississippi, the fact that the
Miranda rule specifically informs police officers what they may do during custodial
interrogations is a benefit that "outweigh[s] the burdens that the decision in Miranda
imposes on law enforcement agencies." 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990)
97. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
98. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
99. Bowman, supra note 26, at 1188.
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investigations.1"° To expect a suspect to clearly assert anything
when faced with such coercion seems inconsistent. 101
In defense of its effort to protect the legitimate activities of law
enforcement, the Court reasoned that a rule requiring police to cease
questioning upon any request for counsel would hamper them
unduly."°  While this may be true, the Court did not address
whether a clarification approach would pose the same burden.'o
Because the officers already would be engaged in asking questions,
requiring them to ask a few more specifically designed to clarify the
suspect's response would not increase the burden significantly.
Furthermore, whatever burden may be imposed seems minimal when
compared to the benefit of allowing individuals the power to exercise
their constitutional right to counsel.1 4
Perhaps the best solution would be to require police officers to
ask a suspect, immediately after they read his Miranda rights, if he
wants to talk with an attorney before answering any questions. 5
100. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447-70.
101. Arguably, the deep-seated fear of coercion that animated the Miranda Court is not
what animated the Court in later decisions, given the number of cases that weakened the
effect of Miranda. See supra note 41. But see supra note 42 (noting precedent supporting
a more liberal construction of Miranda). However, as one commentator noted, the recent
decision in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), reflects the Court's recent efforts
to reinvigorate Miranda. Wolff, supra note 42, at 1181. The decision in Michigan v.
Harvey also seems to indicate a concern about police coercion. See 494 U.S. 344, 350
(1990) (stating that the rule adopted in Edwards v. Arizona was "designed to prevent
police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights").
102. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355-56.
103. The majority's opinion in Davis recognized the benefit to both the suspect and the
law enforcement officers of requiring the officers to ask clarifying questions when it stated:
"Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an
attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed
due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's statement
regarding counsel." Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. However, without explanation, the majority
refused to adopt such a rule. Id.
104. It may be true that these questions will hamper law enforcement by encouraging
suspects to get a lawyer and thereby forcing the interrogation to cease until a lawyer is
provided. However, as the Miranda Court pointed out, "the Constitution has prescribed
the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it
provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness
against himself. That right cannot be abridged." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966). If a suspect, by requesting counsel and delaying his interrogation, is only doing
what he is empowered to do under the Constitution, that is not an undue burden on law
enforcement.
105. David Lavey, United States v. Porter: A New Solution to the Old Problem of
Miranda and Ambiguous Requests for Counsel, 20 GA. L. REv. 221,251 (1985). Not only
could the question be posed immediately following the Miranda warnings, but also after
any subsequent request for counsel that appears to be ambiguous.
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Since the suspect would only have to answer "yes" or "no," this
solution could eliminate ambiguous requests altogether. 6 A rule
requiring this question would maintain the bright-line advantages of
the Edwards rule, for it would provide clear guidelines for police
conduct and would be easy for courts to apply, and would reflect
more accurately the true intentions of the suspect.10
The impact of Davis remains to be seen. Perhaps, as Justice
Souter suggested, courts will apply the ruling sensibly and inter-
rogators will continue to clarify suspects' ambiguous statements as a
measure of "good police practice."'" Undoubtedly, however, a case
will arise in which interrogators do not stop to clarify an equivocal
statement, and the Court will be faced with adjudicating the officers'
judgment that the statement was not sufficient to invoke the right to
counsel. The Court may then recognize that, given the variety of
ambiguous statements that could be made and the vast number of
circumstances in which they could occur, the.bright-line rule that it
purportedly tried to preserve in Davis does not exist in practice. The
only way truly to know when the suspect is requesting counsel and,
consequently, when the police must cease their interrogation, is to ask
him. Until the Court adopts a clarification approach, police will
continue guessing whether a suspect's ambiguous statement is an
attempt to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. As a result,
some individuals who actually desire counsel will be denied this
protection.
DAVID EDWARD SIPPRELL
106. Id. at 252. If, however, the suspect still hesitates or seems confused, the
interrogating officers could further explain his rights. Id.
107. lit Such a test may have been appropriate in the present case. Although Davis
allegedly stated that he did not want a lawyer when the officers attempted to clarify his
initial, ambiguous statement, the interrogating officers had not asked him a simple "yes"
or "no" question. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. Even if Davis had answered "no," thus
leading to the same result as in the instant case, the ambiguity would have been removed.
The distinction may not seem significant, but the difference between asking someone to
clarify his statement and asking him to answer a "yes" or "no" question may be crucial
when the person is unsophisticated or intimidated by a custodial interrogation.
This author argues only that the standard adopted in Davis-not the result-was
incorrect. It appears from the record that Davis was not requesting a lawyer, see id., and
thus, his statements should not have been excluded from his trial. See supra notes 16-21
and accompanying text.
108. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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